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INTRODUCTION 
As of June 2018, approximately fifty-four percent of Americans 
support the death penalty,1 while thirty-nine percent are opposed to it.2 
Furthermore, when given a choice between lethal injection, the electric chair, 
the gas chamber, firing squad, or hanging, sixty-five percent of people opined 
that lethal injection is the most humane form of punishment.3 Despite this 
public approval, data from 2014 might surprise many, showing that lethal 
injection has had the highest rate of errors in executions when compared to 
all of these purportedly less-humane methods.4 Evidence of these botched 
executions directly contradicts states’ proposition that lethal injection is 
“quick, clean and painless.”5 What if lethal injection is actually the least 
humane method to date, but no one sentenced to execution by lethal injection 
can prove that it is cruel and unusual punishment? 
In a spirited dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in a 
recent case alleging that Alabama’s lethal injection protocol is cruel and 
unusual, Justice Sonia Sotomayor contemplated this very issue by saying, 
“What cruel irony that the method that appears most humane may turn out to 
be our most cruel experiment yet.”6 The controversial lethal injection method 
that was at issue then also was challenged in an earlier case, Glossip v. Gross, 
which is the focus of this note.7 In Glossip, the Supreme Court affirmed and 
applied a test for assessing claims regarding whether a particular method of 
execution violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.8   
Considering the significance of the death penalty and the 
longstanding debate surrounding the bounds of its constitutionality, the 
Supreme Court has heard numerous arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of capital punishment and specific methods of execution 
implemented by the states. The Supreme Court now considers it well-settled, 
however, that capital punishment is constitutional.9 Furthermore, never once 
 
 1. This note uses the terms “death penalty” and “capital punishment” interchangeably.  
 2. Death Penalty Information Center, National Polls and Studies, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/public-opinion-polls/national-polls-and-studies#
pew2018 (last visited September 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PGH8-UDTZ]. 
 3. Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/national-polls-and-studies#
pew2018 (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R8XK-76JM]. 
 4. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S 
DEATH PENALTY 123 (2014); see generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the public does not fully understand the current state of 
the death penalty and that if they did, they would have different views about it). 
 5. SARAT, supra note 4, at 6. 
 6. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 733 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 7. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), aff’g by an equally divided court Warner 
v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 9. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 
(1976)).  
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has the Court struck down a state’s method of execution as unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment,10 giving states considerable flexibility in how 
to implement a sentence of death. Consequently, the Court’s conclusion that 
the death penalty is constitutional has implicitly led to the idea that all 
possible methods of execution must also be deemed constitutional.  
This note concludes that the Glossip test for determining when a 
method of execution runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment and constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment improperly limits Eighth Amendment 
protection. Therefore, it should be overturned in favor of a new, more 
practical and impartial test that would lighten the prisoners’ burden and hold 
states more accountable while still enabling states to carry out executions. 
Part I begins by examining the history of the death penalty in America, 
specifically exploring the nation’s journey through various execution 
methods and the conclusion that lethal injection is the most humane method. 
Part II discusses the Supreme Court decision in Baze v. Rees11 and the 
subsequent case, Glossip v. Gross,12 which led to the Court’s arrival at the 
current test for assessing challenges to execution methods under the Eighth 
amendment. Part III illuminates the problems that the Glossip test creates. 
Finally, Part IV contends that the Supreme Court should overrule Glossip 
and proposes an alternative test for assessing method of execution cases.   
I.   THE EVOLUTION OF EXECUTION METHODS IN AMERICA 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted,”13 and it initially only applied to the federal government.14 The 
Fourteenth Amendment provided a vehicle by which the Bill of Rights, 
including the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, could be equally binding on state and local governments.15 The 
language in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mirrors 
that of the Fifth Amendment16 and served as the basis for the selective 
incorporation doctrine. The Supreme Court used this doctrine to determine 
which rights protected by the Bill of Rights were fundamental to our concept 
of “ordered liberty” such that they needed to be honored by the states as well 
as the federal government.17  
In 1962, the Supreme Court expressly ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment applies to the states with regard to the Cruel and Unusual 
 
 10. Id. at 48. 
 11. Id. at 47. 
 12. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737–38. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 14. Raff Donelson, Who Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259, 279 (2017). 
 15. THOMAS G. WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION 54 (2008).  
 16. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
 17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937). 
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Punishment Clause.18 Although the death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment when imposed on certain offenders19 and for certain offenses,20 
the death penalty itself has never been found to violate the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment nor any other provision of the Constitution.21 
Textual interpretations of the Due Process Clause suggest that there must be 
instances in which someone’s life may be constitutionally taken.22 Therefore, 
the framers accepted the death penalty as a tolerable form of punishment.23  
Throughout America’s experiment with capital punishment, the 
prevailing method of execution has evolved consistent with the prevailing 
views that the next method is more humane than the last.24 Hanging was the 
primary method of execution in the United States for many years, and over 
half of the executions carried out in the United States have been by hanging.25 
Execution by hanging required only rope and a tree or scaffold, so it could 
be easily implemented regardless of the available resources.26 People likely 
preferred hanging because it was easy to perform and because the public 
nature of it served a desired penological purpose, general deterrence.27 The 
rationale was that if the entire community witnessed a criminal being hung, 
it would encourage them to refrain from committing a crime themselves.28 
Hanging continued to prevail as the leading method of execution 
until the late 1800s when the New York Legislature appointed a commission 
to discover “the most humane and practical method known to modern science 
of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases.”29 As a result of 
the commission’s findings in 1890, the state of New York performed the first 
execution by electrocution.30 The United States Supreme Court approved 
electrocution as an acceptable method because it did not “involve torture or 
a lingering  death” or “something inhuman and barbarous.”31 New York’s 
use of electrocution represented a major turning point, as many states 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).  
 19. See Death Penalty Information Center, Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/4UMW-KPZG] (listing all of the crimes for which each state has made the 
death penalty an available punishment). 
 20. Id. 
 21. WALKER, supra note 15, at 59. 
 22. Id. at 59–60. 
 23. Id. Noting this context, this note merely examines method of execution challenges 
and makes no attack on the constitutionality of the death penalty.  
 24. WALKER, supra note 15, at 57; Chris Wilson, Every Execution in U.S. History in a 
Single Chart, TIME (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://time.com/82375/every-execution-in-u-s-
history-in-a-single-chart/  [https://perma.cc/3VYE-BBBK]. 
 25. See Wilson, supra note 24. 
 26.  Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death 
Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 790 (2008). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890). 
 30. Dieter, supra note 26, at 790–91. 
 31. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. 
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followed New York’s lead, triggering a shift in favor of this new, more 
private method of execution.32 
In 1924, Nebraska introduced another method of execution—lethal 
gas.33 With this method, a prisoner is locked inside a gas chamber and 
expected to breathe deeply to expedite the process.34 Although Nebraska, like 
New York, sought a more humane method of execution in developing the gas 
chamber, witnesses asserted that there was “evidence of extreme horror, pain, 
and strangling. The eyes pop. The skin turns purple and the victim begins to 
drool.”35 Therefore, the search for a more humane method of execution went 
on. 
Finally, in 1977, Oklahoma introduced the method that is commonly 
used today, lethal injection.36 Bill Wiseman, an Oklahoma legislator trying 
to assuage his guilty conscience, conceptualized lethal injection.37 Although 
Wiseman fundamentally opposed the death penalty, his political aspirations 
caused him to disregard his beliefs and vote in favor of the death penalty.38 
In an effort to minimize the impact of his decision to support the death 
penalty, Wiseman sought help from the Oklahoma State Medical Examiner, 
Jay Chapman, to develop the first three-drug cocktail to be used in an 
execution.39 Today, all of the states that allow the death penalty have lethal 
injection as a method.40 Despite the intent to effect a more humane, dignified 
death, evidence is beginning to suggest that lethal injection, like execution 
methods that preceded it, might be just as distasteful as the methods that were 
abandoned in favor of it.41 
While lethal injection remains the most widespread method of 
execution among the states, it is not the only method that is approved under 
the various state laws.42 Other methods include hanging, electrocution, and 
the gas chamber.43 Death by firing squad, however, never gained the 
 
 32. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015); see Wilson, supra note 24. 
 33. Death Penalty Information Center, Descriptions of Execution Methods [hereinafter 
“DPIC, Descriptions”], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/descriptions-execution-methods (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BL2Q-EQ3D]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. JACOB WEISBERG, THIS IS YOUR DEATH 26 (1991). 
 36. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33. 
 37. Oklahoma Man Who Developed Lethal Injection Recipe Lived with Regret, NEWS 
ON 6 (May 1, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.newson6.com/story/25406037/oklahoma-man-who-
developed-lethal-injection-recipe-lived-with-regret [https://perma.cc/6WXS-3WVB]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Rick Lowery, The Bible and Lethal Injection: Why the Man Who Wrote Oklahoma’s 
Law Opposed the Death Penalty, HUFFPOST (July 27, 2014, 6:28 PM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/rick-lowery-phd/the-bible-and-lethal-injection_b_5395445.html 
[https://perma.cc/3VAA-475X]. 
 40. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33. 
 41. See Zaria Gorvette, The People Rethinking Methods of Execution, BBC FUTURE 
(June 6, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20180604-is-there-a-humane-way-to-kill-a-
criminal [https://perma.cc/Z28D-JJAN]. 
 42. DPIC, Descriptions, supra note 33.  
 43. Id. 
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popularity of the other methods.44 It is worth noting, however, because Utah 
reinstated it as a backup method in 2015 as a result of a nationwide shortage 
of common lethal injection drugs.45 Like Utah, most states have statutes that 
allow for backup methods of execution that provide for alternative methods 
if the primary method is unavailable or found to be unconstitutional.46 
Currently, however, only three states have a provision allowing for firing 
squads: Utah, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.47 
While the death penalty is predominantly a state issue given the 
significantly higher number of persons executed by the states,48 the federal 
government also utilizes the death penalty.49 Unlike some of the state laws 
addressed above, federal law does not list alternative, backup execution 
methods.50 The Code of Federal Regulations provides the following: “Except 
to the extent a court orders otherwise, a sentence of death shall be executed 
. . . [b]y intravenous injection of a lethal substance or substances in a quantity 
sufficient to cause death. . . .”51  
Lethal injection is undisputedly the principal method of execution in 
America,52 and the historical trend of abandoning execution methods in favor 
of more humane ones suggests that the death penalty states and the federal 
government believe that lethal injection is the most humane method to date.53 
As this note will address, there is evidence to the contrary. Consequently, one 
would expect that a death row inmate could successfully challenge lethal 
injection as an inhumane method of execution. Two recent Supreme Court 
cases serve as examples of inmates attempting such a challenge.  
 
 44. See Wilson, supra note 24. 
 45. Utah Brings Back Firing Squad Executions; Witnesses Recall the Last One, NPR 
(Apr. 5, 2015, 7:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/05/397672199/utah-brings-back-
firing-squad-executions-witnesses-recall-the-last-one [https://perma.cc/HSQ9-5H55]. 
 46. Death Penalty Information Center, Methods of Execution [hereinafter “DPIC, 
Methods”], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/5WVA-4BNL]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Death Penalty Information Center, State & Federal Info, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/federal-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 11, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/EW4D-RYL6]. 
 49. Death Penalty Information Center, Federal Laws Providing for the Death Penalty, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-laws-providing-death-penalty (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/9CNF-MYWP]. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (2019). 
 52. DPIC, Methods, supra note 46. 
 53. See Dieter, supra note 26, at 814–15. 
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II.   EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING METHOD OF 
EXECUTION CHALLENGES 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the death penalty 
is not per se unconstitutional.54 As such, the Justices are hesitant to declare 
that a state’s chosen method of execution is unconstitutional because such a 
ruling could threaten the death penalty as a whole.55 The Court’s opinions in 
Baze v. Rees56 and subsequently, Glossip v. Gross,57 which reaffirmed Baze, 
outline the test used to determine whether a state’s execution method 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment that is violative of the Eighth 
Amendment. This section explains these decisions and lays the groundwork 
for the current landscape regarding method of execution challenges.  
A. Baze v. Rees 
The Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion for Baze v. Rees in 
2008, when thirty-six states and the federal government had capital 
punishment as an available sentence for certain crimes.58 At that time, every 
jurisdiction that utilized capital punishment, including Kentucky, the subject 
of the case, used lethal injection as a potential method of carrying out the 
execution.59 The petitioners in Baze, Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling,60 
were both convicted of double homicides and sentenced to death. The death 
sentence called for both Mr. Baze and Mr. Bowling to be executed by lethal 
injection.61 Similar to most other states, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol 
called for a three-drug cocktail using sodium thiopental, pancuronium 
bromide, and potassium chloride.62 The drugs, used in that order, are intended 
to render the individual unconscious, paralyze his or her body, and finally, 
induce cardiac arrest.63 
Petitioners Baze and Bowling contended that Kentucky’s lethal 
injection method constituted cruel and unusual punishment because there 
was a risk that the protocol might not be administered properly and could, 
therefore, result in significant pain.64 The trial court, in a bench trial, heard 
testimony from approximately twenty witnesses, including some experts, and 
found that the risk of incorrect administration of the protocol was minimal, 
 
 54. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
47, 47 (2008)), aff’d sub nom., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 55. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33, 2738. 
 56. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50. 
 57. Glossip 135 S. Ct. at 2737–38. 
 58. Baze, 553 U.S. at 40. 
 59. Id. at 40–41. 
 60. Id. at 46. 
 61. Id. at 41.  
 62. Id. at 44. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 41. 
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considering the numerous safeguards65 included. The case went to the 
Kentucky Supreme Court, which determined that an execution method 
violates the Eighth Amendment when it “creates a substantial risk of wanton 
and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death.”66 Noting the 
applicable standard, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a plurality opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts,67 agreed that Kentucky’s protocol 
survived the Eighth Amendment.68 The by-product of this opinion was a two-
prong test in which inmates, to successfully argue that their method of 
execution violates the Eighth Amendment, must show that the chosen 
execution method presents “a substantial risk of serious harm,” which has 
also been described as an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.”69 
Additionally, the inmates must plead and prove an alternative execution 
method that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly 
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”70  
Inmates must prove, therefore, that the challenged method presents 
a risk that is “substantial when compared to the known and available 
alternatives.”71 Finally, if an inmate meets this burden and presents a feasible 
alternative, there is one more inquiry for the Court. There might be cruel and 
unusual punishment if the state cannot proffer a “legitimate penological 
justification” for retaining its current execution method and refusing to adopt 
the inmate’s proposed alternative in light of its proven benefits.72  
Before applying the articulated test to the facts of Baze, the Court 
noted that it would be difficult to characterize Kentucky’s execution method 
as “objectively intolerable” because it is in fact “widely tolerated.”73 In 
making this observation, the Court was referring not only to the nationwide 
tolerance of lethal injection as an acceptable method in general, but also to 
the exact three-drug protocol Kentucky used.74 At the time, thirty states and 
the federal government used the same combination of drugs: sodium 
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.75 
 
 65. The trial court and the Supreme Court found the following safeguards of the 
protocol, among others, to be significant: only qualified personnel with at least one year of 
professional experience are responsible for inserting the IV catheters, the warden and deputy 
warden stay in the execution chamber to ensure that the first drug is successful and to watch 
for problems with the tubing, and a physician is present to help revive the prisoner in the event 
of a last-minute stay of execution. Id. at 45–46. 
 66. Id. at 46 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006)). 
 67. Justices Kennedy and Alito joined the opinion. See id. at 63, 71. 
 68. Id. at 47. 
 69. Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 n.9 (1994)). 
 70. Id. at 52. 
 71. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 52. 
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. (citing Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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The Court went on, however, to acknowledge that this “broad 
consensus” was not per se dispositive.76 The fact that lethal injection was 
widely tolerated and used was merely the beginning of the Court’s analysis. 
The Court assessed the validity of the petitioners’ claim by declaring that the 
petitioners had the “heavy burden” of showing that Kentucky’s lethal 
injection procedure is “cruelly inhumane.”77 The potential for inaccurate 
administration of the first drug in the process was the gravamen of the 
petitioners’ challenge. The Court accepted the uncontested fact that if a 
prisoner did not get an accurate dose of the sodium thiopental sufficient to 
result in unconsciousness, “a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk 
of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain 
from the injection of potassium chloride” would follow.78 
The Court was not impressed with the petitioners’ argument that 
such an error was likely to occur, however. The Court determined that the 
instructions being printed on the package, explaining how to calculate and 
mix the dosage, made it doubtful that the sodium thiopental would be 
prepared incorrectly.79 Similarly, anticipated issues with the IV lines were 
also not enough to sway the Court because of the numerous safeguards 
included in Kentucky’s protocol.80 The most significant safeguard, according 
to the Court, is the requirement that the IV team members must have at least 
one year of relevant professional experience.81  Therefore, the “risks” that the 
petitioners asserted were neither “so substantial or imminent” as to serve as 
the foundation for an Eighth Amendment violation.82 The Court highlighted 
the protocol’s safeguards as evidence that the alleged risks of harm were 
unlikely, thus negating most of the petitioners’ argument.83  
Accordingly, the Court held that petitioners had not satisfied the first 
prong of the test because they failed to prove that there was a “substantial 
risk of serious harm.”84 Despite this, the Court still considered the fact that 
the petitioners did propose an alternative that would use only a single drug. 
Notably, however, it was a procedure that no state had tried or even 
adopted.85 Since that method had never been used, petitioners had no 
evidence or data demonstrating its effectiveness.86 Because of this, the Court 
concluded that Kentucky’s refusal to adopt the proposed method did not 
implicate Eighth Amendment concerns.87 Similarly-situated inmates hoping 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). 
 78. Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 27). 
 79. Id. at 54 (quoting 5 Tr. 695 (Apr. 19, 2005)). 
 80. Id. at 55. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 56. 
 83. Id. at 55. 
 84. Id. at 53–54. 
 85. See id. at 41, 56. 
 86. Id. at 56–57. 
 87. See id. at 56–57, 62. 
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to propose novel execution methods encounter this same obstacle of having 
no evidence to support the method’s efficacy.  
B. Glossip v. Gross 
The Supreme Court decided Glossip v. Gross88 approximately seven 
years after Baze. Richard Glossip was one of twenty-one inmates on death 
row who brought a 42 U.S.C. § 198389 claim challenging Oklahoma’s lethal 
injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment.90 All of the inmates faced 
death sentences as a result of first-degree murder convictions.91 Four 
plaintiffs—Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin 
Cole—filed for a preliminary injunction to stay their executions until the 
overall case was decided on the merits because they had set execution dates.92 
The basis of the complaint was that the first of the three drugs used in 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, midazolam, would not serve its 
essential purpose of rendering the inmates insensate to pain.93 This first drug 
is intended to shield the inmate from the discomfort of receiving the paralytic 
and ultimately, the cardiac arrest-inducing drug.  
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the 
prisoners’ preliminary injunction because it found the prisoners’ arguments 
that midazolam has a ceiling effect and could result in paradoxical reactions 
and negligent administration speculative.94 Applying the standard from Baze, 
the District Court found that the prisoners had failed to show that the chosen 
lethal injection protocol presents a substantial risk of pain when compared to 
known and available alternatives.95 In essence, the prisoners were unable to 
prove that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol presented a substantial risk 
of harm. Additionally, they did not sufficiently plead and prove that there is 
a feasible, readily implemented alternative method. The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, finding no grounds upon which to reverse.96 
By the time the case got to the Supreme Court, one of the petitioners, 
Charles Warner, had already been executed with the three-drug cocktail 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. To summarize, § 1983 creates a cause of action allowing individuals to allege a 
deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017). 
 90. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 723 (10th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Glossip v. 
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 91. Id. at 723. 
 92. Id. at 723–24. 
 93. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731. 
 94. The plaintiffs argued that midazolam has a ceiling effect, meaning that after a certain 
dosage level is administered, “incremental increases in dosage . . . have no corresponding 
incremental effect.” Warner, 776 F.3d at 726. Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that 
midazolam presents a risk of paradoxical reactions such as “agitation, involuntary movements, 
hyperactivity, and combativeness” that makes midazolam inapt as a “stand-alone anesthetic.” 
Id. at 726–27 (quoting ROA Vol. 1 at 960). 
 95. Id. at 731 (quoting ROA Vol. 3 at 927). 
 96. Id. at 735–36. 
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utilizing midazolam.97 Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, ruling 
against the remaining petitioners.98 The central theme of the opinion was that 
rigorous standards must be maintained because without them, challenges to 
a particular method of execution could serve as a means of dismantling the 
death penalty, itself.99 Those rigorous standards were articulated by the Court 
in Baze and affirmed in this case.100  
The Court utilized three important principles as the basis for that 
affirmation. First, because it is well-established that capital punishment is a 
constitutional form of punishment, “[i]t necessarily follows that there must 
be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.”101 Second, in the long history 
of the death penalty in America, the Court has never found a state’s chosen 
method of execution to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.102 Finally, 
even the most humane methods of execution may result in some inherent risk 
of pain, however, “the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk 
of pain.”103 
With these principles in mind, the Court looked to what was 
articulated in Baze as the appropriate test, considering whether the method in 
question presented a substantial risk of serious harm and whether the inmates 
sufficiently proved that there was a feasible, readily implemented alternative 
that would significantly reduce the substantial risk of pain.104 The test can be 
more succinctly explained as determining whether the challenged execution 
method presents a substantial risk of harm “when compared to the known 
and available alternatives.”105 
The Supreme Court explained that the first prong means showing 
that the risks presented are “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and 
needless suffering.”106 In considering this, the Court gave great weight to the 
fact that many courts have concluded that midazolam is likely to render an 
inmate sufficiently insensate to pain and determined that the inmates in this 
case had not met their burden in proving the contrary.107 In further explaining 
the Court’s analysis of the first prong, Justice Alito markedly stated that 
“federal courts should not ‘embroil [themselves] in ongoing scientific 
controversies beyond their expertise.’”108 
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The majority also concluded that the inmates failed to prove that 
there was a “known and available alternative method of execution.”109 The 
inmates proposed the use of sodium thiopental (or pentobarbital in the 
absence of sodium thiopental) as a single-drug protocol because these drugs 
are arguably better-able to render an inmate insensate.110 These proposed 
drugs had both been used in successful executions, but the Court affirmed 
the lower courts’ determination that both were now unavailable.111 Although 
these inmates proposed two well-tested drugs, they could not satisfy the 
alternative prong. Without directly explaining whether pentobarbital or 
sodium thiopental would be substantially less painful than midazolam,  the 
Court concluded that both of these proposed drugs were unavailable.112  
Justice Breyer’s dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion 
debated solely the constitutionality of the death penalty in general, which is 
beyond the scope of this note.113 However, Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
warrants some discussion.114 Thomas posed the following questions, which 
have remained unanswered since the Baze decision: “At what point does a 
risk become ‘substantial’? What makes an alternative procedure ‘feasible’ 
and ‘readily implemented’? When is a reduction in risk ‘significant?’ What 
penological justifications are ‘legitimate?’”115 This note does not undertake 
the task of answering these questions, but it highlights the fact that they 
remain unanswered, leaving inmates unsure of what is required of them. 
Thomas also argued that an execution method only violates the 
Eighth Amendment “if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.”116 He 
contended that the inmates in this case had no valid claim since they did not 
attempt to argue that Oklahoma chose midazolam specifically to “add 
elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the death penalty.”117 This is an 
intriguing conclusion, but it is one that is not supported by the language or 
policy of the Eighth Amendment because the amendment provides for an 
outright prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,118 not one that is 
effective only if the state’s purpose was to inflict torture. This must be the 
case because to think otherwise would mean that if a state proposed a method 
of execution that would be sufficiently torturous simply because it was their 
only option, it would not violate the Eighth Amendment by Justice Thomas’s 
approach. 
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion explained that if the 
midazolam did not function as intended, the use of the remaining drugs in the 
protocol would torturously cause “burning, searing pain” while the inmate is 
unable to express discomfort due to the paralytic.119 Contrary to the majority, 
Sotomayor concluded that the inmates furnished ample evidence to show that 
this risk posed by the state’s use of midazolam was substantial and 
constitutionally intolerable.120 Mainly, petitioners showed that midazolam 
has a ceiling effect, above which higher dosages are ineffective.121 
Sotomayor posited that the majority ignored substantial evidence suggesting 
that even if midazolam effectively induces unconsciousness, it is incapable 
of maintaining that state when confronted with the pain caused by the 
subsequent drugs.122 
Sotomayor concluded by arguing that the Court’s ruling on the 
alternative prong was “legally indefensible,”123 and turned what should be a 
categorical ban on cruel and unusual punishment into a conditional one.124 
Rather than definitively banning cruel and unusual punishment, the Court 
now finds a method of execution unconstitutional only if there is a “known 
and available alternative.” Additionally, since Baze was a plurality opinion, 
Sotomayor noted that the alternative requirement did not represent the 
majority view and was not the holding.125 She further analyzed the Baze 
opinion to support her contention that what the majority in Glossip 
articulated as the prong of the test that requires plaintiffs to prove that there 
is an available alternative was not actually what the plurality meant,126 but 
for purposes of this note, it is assumed that the current test is what the 
majority applied in Glossip.  
The rule outlined in Glossip resulted in much commentary and 
criticism, and the debate is far from over.127 Justice Sotomayor has reiterated 
her dissatisfaction with the test and the challenges it causes, but to date, she 
has been unable to change the landscape of method of execution cases.128 The 
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subsequent section of this note highlights some of these issues and indicates 
that Justice Sotomayor’s stance is the most logical.129  
III.   PROBLEMS WITH THE ADOPTED TEST  
In response to Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Baze, Chief 
Justice Roberts declared, “the standard we set forth here resolves more 
challenges than [Justice Stevens] acknowledges.”130 Despite that belief, Baze 
and Glossip left many unanswered questions that lower courts have struggled 
to answer.131 The Supreme Court’s failure to adequately define the contours 
of what must be proven in a successful method of execution case under the 
Eighth Amendment is causing inconsistencies between the circuit courts.132 
Even if the Court had gone further and defined each part of the test, however, 
Glossip should still be overturned for four reasons. First, it is inconsistent 
with the Eighth Amendment and limits the protections therein. Second, it 
unfairly creates an errant standard that is nearly impossible for inmates to 
satisfy. Third, the misguided standard that Glossip imposes gives states too 
much deference, thus allowing the state to use virtually any execution method 
they choose. Finally, the states’ unconstrained autonomy over executions 
compromises the integrity of drug manufacturing companies.  
Society has accepted lethal injection under the potentially misguided 
belief that it is humane and simple, but there is mounting evidence to show 
that the first drug in many states’ lethal injection protocol does not and, 
indeed, cannot work as needed or anticipated.133 Prior executions using 
midazolam indicate that upon administration of the second and third drugs, 
inmates might wake up and be conscious of the pain that the first drug was 
supposed to shield them from.134 Despite such evidence that lethal injection 
has the potential to result in lingering and painful death, the Supreme Court 
has shielded it from Eighth Amendment scrutiny by adopting the Glossip test 
that makes it impossible for an inmate to prove that lethal injection could be 
cruel and unusual punishment.  
The definitive effect of the Glossip test is that the protections 
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment collapse. Additionally, all future 
method of execution challengers are fighting a losing battle due to both the 
high burden of proving an alternative and the importance the Supreme Court 
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has placed on maintaining deference to the states in upholding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. 
A. Limited Eighth Amendment Protection 
As Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissenting opinion in Glossip, 
the implication of the majority’s test is that even a very painful execution 
method would violate the Eighth Amendment “if, and only if, there is a 
‘known and available alternative’ method of execution.”135 The Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits cruel and unusual punishment136 and 
thus, a finding of a violation should not be based on whether another 
punishment is available that would be less painful. The Court’s current 
jurisprudence, nonetheless, limits the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection.137 
A historical look at method of execution cases ranging from the first 
one before the United States Supreme Court to today reveals that the 
Supreme Court has never invalidated a state’s chosen method of execution 
as unconstitutional. The Court has appeared comfortable acknowledging that 
certain barbaric methods are clearly unconstitutional, and declared that 
“[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. . . . 
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,—something more than 
the mere extinguishment of life.”138 While people are not guaranteed a 
painless death,139 one that causes lingering death or an inhumane end should 
be considered cruel and unusual. Therefore, the Glossip test contravenes this 
idea by making Eighth Amendment protection provisional, especially since 
the required condition is too difficult to meet.  
Inmates allege that midazolam, the controversial lethal injection 
drug challenged in Glossip—and other cases140—is incapable of adequately 
rendering someone unconscious, resulting in the sensation of being 
chemically burned from the inside.141 Despite evidence of the limitations and 
problems that are possible with midazolam, even when administered as 
written by state protocols,142 the Supreme Court will not conclude that it is 
cruel and unusual unless the inmates can sufficiently satisfy the alternative 
requirement of Glossip. This is a flawed and illogical result.  
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By this standard, an execution method might be deemed cruel and 
unusual one day, because there is a substantially safer alternative. And yet, 
that same method would be constitutional on another day or in another state, 
merely because there are no alternatives. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion 
listed four factors supporting his assertion that the death penalty should be 
outlawed, and one of the factors is arbitrariness.143 The arbitrariness of 
method of execution claims is correspondingly unpalatable.   
If a state decided to execute someone by burning them at the stake, 
which is determinedly torturous, they would be able to do so if the inmate 
was unable to show that there was an available alternative. This is even more 
problematic than it may initially appear because, not only does the alternative 
method have to be feasible, readily implemented, and available, but it also 
has to be an enumerated method that the state provides for by statute.144 This 
aspect of the test will be discussed further, but it completely contravenes an 
important purpose of the Eighth Amendment by requiring the inmate to show 
that the state has authorized another, safer method before being able to find 
relief from cruel and unusual punishment. The burden of the alternative 
prong has the unfortunate consequence of giving too much deference to the 
states at the expense of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment protections. 
 B. Unfair Burden on Death Row Inmates 
Before Glossip, the Supreme Court had never held that a method of 
execution challenge required the proposal of an alternative.145 In previous 
cases, proving an alternative was a way for petitioners to indicate that the 
purpose of the suit was not to nullify their death sentence under the pretextual 
claim that the specific method is unconstitutional.146 In declining to accept 
the government’s view that a petitioner must prove an alternative, the Court 
previously explained that “as long as the civil rights challenge did not 
foreclose execution, it was properly styled, and the condemned prisoner was 
not required to plead or prove an alternative method of execution.”147 The 
Court should return to this reasoning and reject the stringent alternative 
requirement. 
This section argues that the Supreme Court set a bad precedent in 
choosing to defend the death penalty and all proposed methods to such an 
extent as to disregard the constitutional protections guaranteed to death row 
inmates. The Court has created a “perverse requirement” and a “macabre 
challenge”148 that compels condemned prisoners to propose an alternative 
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method for their own executions. In addition to the manifestly unorthodox 
nature of placing this burden on the prisoners rather than the states, there is 
the additional consequence that it is an unattainable standard.149 
Consideration of post-Glossip cases shows that the burden the Court 
has crafted is too heavy to satisfy. In Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama 
Department of Corrections, Alabama’s chosen method of execution used the 
same three drugs that the petitioners in Oklahoma challenged in the Glossip 
case: midazolam, rocuronium bromide,150 and potassium chloride.151 Thomas 
Arthur, who was a death row inmate in Alabama, presented what the District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama deemed “impressive” evidence 
regarding the risks posed by midazolam. However, because the district court 
concluded that Arthur had failed to meet the “known and available 
alternative” requirement, the court did not consider this evidence.152 
Arthur had initially proposed a single drug protocol utilizing either 
pentobarbital or sodium thiopental, which were both the primary lethal 
injection drugs prior to a national shortage153 that resulted in the use of 
midazolam.154 After the district court found that these drugs were not 
available, Arthur filed a motion to amend his complaint to propose the firing 
squad as his alternative.155 The district court denied Arthur again because, 
according to the court, the firing squad was also not a feasible or readily 
implemented alternative because Alabama does not provide for it by 
statute.156 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
judgment in the state’s favor.157  
Alabama’s death penalty statute expressly states the approved 
methods of execution.158 Because the statute does not explicitly allow the 
firing squad, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was beyond the authority 
of the Department of Corrections and declined to consider Arthur’s evidence 
regarding the dangers of midazolam.159 This is one example of an inmate that 
presumably had enough evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that midazolam poses a substantial risk of severe harm but could not win his 
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Eighth Amendment challenge because he could not successfully propose 
another method despite three attempts to do so.160  
Unfortunately, The Supreme Court did not endeavor to define what 
makes a proposed alternative “feasible” or “readily implemented,”161 so it is 
unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit was correct. When considering the 
common, dictionary definitions of the terms, it seems reasonable to think that 
the firing squad could meet these requirements because it would be an 
instantaneous death that requires little resources. Merriam-Webster defines 
“feasible” as “capable of being carried out”162 and “readily” as “without 
much difficulty.”163 Under these definitions, Arthur clearly met his burden, 
but Glossip has been interpreted to mean that the method must also be 
expressly authorized by the state’s execution statute.164 One court markedly 
suggested that this understanding of the availability requirement places a near 
“impossible burden” on plaintiffs challenging their method of execution,165 
which is the one of the main issues with Glossip that this note highlights. 
Surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit held in a 2017 case that the plaintiffs 
successfully argued that pentobarbital was an available alternative despite 
Ohio being unable to purchase it and having none on hand because the 
plaintiffs proposed using compounded pentobarbital.166 The plaintiffs argued 
that, to succeed, they needed to propose a method that is possible, not 
necessarily one that the state has on hand.167 This is a more lenient standard 
than what other circuits have adopted168 and shows that death row inmates 
are not only saddled by the crude requirement of Glossip. They are also 
subject to the inconsistency of not knowing how the circuit they are in will 
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interpret “alternative.” The courts are divided and need answers from the 
Supreme Court,169 so it should not be long before there is an opportunity to 
correct these issues along with the others that resulted from Glossip. 
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s more lenient approach, a recent case in 
Tennessee, Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, highlighted the issue of this undue 
burden on method of execution challengers.170 Despite others’ failure, thirty-
three death row inmates in Tennessee sought a declaration that the state’s 
lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment, mainly due to the 
risks posed by midazolam.171 The inmates proposed pentobarbital as an 
alternative since it was one of two options written in Tennessee’s execution 
protocol.172 Two days after the inmates proposed pentobarbital, the 
Tennessee Department of Corrections changed the protocol to remove 
pentobarbital as an alternate method.173 
Despite expert testimony about midazolam’s failure to act as a 
sufficient analgesic, the feeling of suffocation caused by vecuronium 
bromide, and the burning feeling of potassium chloride, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court focused on the inmates’ failure to prove an alternative and 
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.174 One of the inmates, 
Billy Ray Irick, was scheduled to be executed on August 9, 2018, and when 
the Supreme Court denied his application for a stay of execution, Justice 
Sotomayor again dissented.175  
Justice Sotomayor lamented, “If the law permits this execution to go 
forward in spite of the horrific final minutes that Irick may well experience, 
then we have stopped being a civilized nation and accepted barbarism.”176 
Tennessee proceeded to execute Irick utilizing the debated drug, and 
witnesses observed him choking, moving his head, and straining against the 
restraints on his arms.177 Dr. Lubarsky, the expert witness who testified for 
the inmates at trial, indicated that Irick was likely not in a general plane of 
anesthesia while being killed, and was therefore subject to the “torturous 
effects” of the drugs.178 This unfortunate outcome was largely a result of the 
inmates being unable to satisfy the insuperable burden required by Glossip.  
In addition to providing an example of someone suffering because 
the Glossip requirements are impossible to satisfy, the Abdur’Rahman case 
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shows states’ willingness to act in bad faith to shield their chosen execution 
methods. The Tennessee Department of Corrections initially had the option 
to execute using the three-drug protocol or pentobarbital alone, but 
conveniently decided to remove pentobarbital on the eve of trial to support 
their contention that it was unavailable.179 While it is very likely that it would 
have been extremely difficult for Tennessee officials to obtain pentobarbital, 
their actions raised suspicions that Glossip permitted the court to ignore 
because, under Glossip, inmates bear the burden of proving an alternative. 
Because of Glossip’s irrational burden, what we see, as illustrated by 
Abdur’Rahman, is that the state can act in bad faith and remove an alternative 
from a statute, solely for the purpose of frustrating the inmate’s claim.  
C. Excessive Deference to States  
As Justice Alito iterated in Glossip, the purpose of the alternative 
requirement of the test is to prevent inmates from attacking the death penalty 
in general by presenting a pretextual argument that the methods the states 
chose are unconstitutional.180 While this may be decent motivation, the 
Supreme Court has drawn a very fine line between upholding the death 
penalty and giving the states unconditional authority to utilize any method of 
execution they choose.181 Additionally, this deference allows the states to 
employ any means necessary to procure lethal injection drugs without fear 
that the questionable circumstances may serve as grounds for a successful 
Eighth Amendment challenge.182 
If a state wanted to execute someone with an unconstitutionally 
torturous method, they would be permitted to do so, as long as the relevant 
statute did not provide for any other method of execution.183 Giving 
deference to the states is one thing, but disregarding the Supremacy Clause 
is another. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is a crucial guarantee 
that ensures that the Constitution and other federal laws take precedence over 
state law.184 Accordingly, a test that essentially shields states from judicial 
review cannot possibly be acceptable.185 
Not only does the unlikelihood of success under Glossip give the 
states an avenue to directly infringe on death row inmates’ constitutional 
rights, but it also permits the states to illegally obtain execution drugs, which 
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may include some that are compounded and therefore, untested.186 It may 
sound like a good argument for plaintiffs to say that, because the state 
illegitimately obtained drugs that may not be what they are proffered as or 
work as they should, their executions would be an experiment and 
constitutional violation. The Glossip test, however, grants boundless ability 
to the states to continue acting in a reprehensible manner because men and 
women on death row are unable to convince the courts of an alternative 
method for carrying out their execution.187  
Because there is virtually no way that a prisoner would have the 
resources to sufficiently propose an alternative, scholars have characterized 
Glossip as imposing an “impossible pleading standard” that is 
“unprovable.”188 This is partly due to the secrecy laws enacted by many states 
that make information regarding drug acquisition, budgets, capabilities, 
personnel, and all related information in the sole control of the state and not 
to be disclosed.189 These secrecy laws further lead states to illegitimate 
procurement methods, including the black market.190 Jennifer Moreno, a staff 
attorney for the Death Penalty Clinic at the University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law, explained that “States are now buying drugs from 
illegal sources, ordering new ones from compounding pharmacies or trading 
with other states.”191 This behavior should be sanctioned rather than 
tolerated. 
The Supreme Court has essentially relished the fact that it has never 
invalidated a state’s chosen method of execution,192 but “[c]ourts’ review of 
execution methods should be more, not less, searching when States are 
engaged in what is in effect human experimentation.”193 Especially because 
the consequences not only affect the lives of the inmates that must endure the 
outcome, but have larger implications as well. 
D. Jeopardized Integrity of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Because the result of Glossip gives states free rein to get lethal 
injection drugs by any means, the drug manufacturers are forced to bolster 
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their attempts to protect the integrity of the industry.194 Sodium thiopental 
and pentobarbital were manufactured and approved for therapeutic reasons 
such as insomnia, preoperative sedation, and management of seizures.195 
Once these drugs began being favored as lethal injection drugs, they quickly 
became unavailable.196 There was only one manufacturer of sodium 
thiopental in America, and it chose to stop making the drug altogether to 
prevent its use in lethal injections, thus removing it from its intended uses as 
well.197 Similarly, anti-death penalty advocates pressured European 
manufacturers to stop producing pentobarbital, which became the primary 
execution drug after sodium thiopental became unavailable.198 
This shows how allowing the state to get the drugs however they can, 
including ignoring manufacturers’ distribution controls or using the black 
market, puts drug manufacturers in a tough position that compels them to 
decide whether to be complacent with the improper use or to halt production 
altogether to the detriment of the people for whom the drug was made.199 The 
spokesperson for Lundbeck, the Danish pharmaceutical company that made 
pentobarbital, stated, “This [lethal injection] is a misuse of our product. We 
are in an ethical dilemma where we are opposed to the use of our medication 
for capital punishment while at the same time we want to make sure that 
patients who benefit from our medication get access to it.”200 
Unfortunately, manufacturers’ hopes of keeping the drugs available 
for those who need it proved to be difficult given the manufacturers’ 
contemporaneous commitment to keeping the drugs out of prisons.201 
Pharmaceutical companies face fiscal, reputational, and legal risks when 
their drugs end up being used for lethal injections.202 These companies 
currently have no meaningful way of ensuring that their products are not 
being used for lethal injections due to the secrecy laws of many states and 
the states’ willingness and ability to disregard implemented distribution 
controls. The Lethal Injection Information Center created a risk index 
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highlighting which states pose the greatest threat for misuse of drugs, with 
eighteen states being categorized as high-risk.203 It explained: 
Despite repeated requests from pharmaceutical companies 
that their medicines not be diverted for use in capital 
punishment, Alabama has pressed ahead in its efforts to 
secure these firms’ products under the cover of a sweeping 
secrecy law. In doing so, Alabama officials may be 
knowingly and deliberately undermining the contractual 
restrictions that companies have established to prevent the 
same of their drugs to death rows.204 
Courts should consider such illegitimate acquisition methods in 
assessing whether a method of execution is constitutional. However, because 
of Glossip, petitioners’ claims consistently fail at the outset when they are 
unable to overcome the burden of demonstrating an alternative method of 
execution. Prisoners, unlike the states, are not allowed to break the law in 
search of execution drugs, so Glossip presents an unfair advantage in favor 
of the states. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies are left having to sue 
the states for improper acquisition and use in defiance of the companies’ 
stance against executions.205 
IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the Supreme Court’s objective in keeping method of 
execution claims from dismantling the entire system of capital punishment 
was sound, Glossip missed the mark. Criminal defense lawyer and author, 
Clive Stafford Smith wrote, “[W]e know that mistakes are inevitable, so 
roughly what error rate are we willing to accept, in light of the value of our 
goal?”206 No one expects the Court to issue flawless opinions that create win-
win situations for everyone involved, but how much are we willing to ignore 
in furtherance of the idea that there must be constitutional means of 
implementing the death penalty? 
The bad precedent set forth in Glossip should be overruled and 
replaced by a new test because the Glossip decision limits the protection 
awarded by the Eighth Amendment, presents a challenge that cannot be won, 
allows states to go unchecked, and compromises the pharmaceutical industry. 
The new test should involve a threshold inquiry and a burden-shifting 
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framework, resulting in a more balanced approach that will require some 
accountability on the states’ part.  
A. Overturning Precedent 
At times, the Supreme Court opts to uphold conceivably bad 
decisions because the Justices value precedent.207 The long-standing 
principle of stare decisis means that the Supreme Court is expected to adhere 
to previous rulings until there is adequate reasoning to abandon the prior 
ruling.208 The purpose of reverencing precedent is to provide predictability 
and finality.209 However, this is not always the best option.  
To Justice Thomas, precedent is never a sufficient reason for 
upholding bad law,210 so he is perhaps the most likely to change his vote in 
favor of the four dissenters in Glossip.211 Justice Scalia once said of Thomas, 
“[He] doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.”212 Despite Thomas being an 
outlier in this belief, he is unwavering in pushing his colleagues to reevaluate 
their decisions when they have gotten it wrong.213 For Thomas, “the ultimate 
precedent is the Constitution.”214 Although not ideal, the Court must overrule 
precedent to correct mistakes.215 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
when deciding whether to overturn the controversial holding of Roe v. 
Wade,216 the Court discussed factors to consider when assessing the effect of 
overturning precedent.217 The Court explained that the purpose of these 
“prudential and pragmatic considerations” is to “test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”218 
Justice O’Connor listed the following inquiries as the basis for this 
consideration: (1) “whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability”; (2) “whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
 
 207. Randy Kozel, The Problem of Precedent, WASH. POST (July 10, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/10/the-problem-of-
precedent/ [https://perma.cc/369G-8RKZ]. 
 208. WALKER, supra note 15, at 55. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Lincoln Caplan, Clarence Thomas’s Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomass-brand-of-
judicial-logic.html [https://perma.cc/XTK5-8H6W]. 
 211. Glossip was a 5–4 decision with Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan 
dissenting. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015). 
 212. Caplan, supra note 210.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. The Court held in Roe that women’s constitutional right to privacy encompasses the 
right to choose to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973). 
 217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
 218. Id. at 854. 
190 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:166 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling 
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”; (3) “whether related principles 
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of an abandoned doctrine;” and (4) “whether facts have so changed, 
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.”219 The Supreme Court decided Glossip v. Gross 
approximately seven years after Baze v. Rees.220 Analysis of these factors 
indicates that, when Glossip was decided, the Court should have voted to 
overturn Baze. The circumstances that fuel this necessity are even more true 
today.  
The first inquiry is whether the rule has proven to be intolerable 
simply in defying practical workability.221 This is arguably the factor that 
weighs the most heavily in favor of overturning Glossip. The rule is entirely 
unworkable and left multiple unanswered questions, leaving lower courts lost 
as to what the Justices meant.222 Part III outlined the issues with Glossip that 
need not be reiterated,223 but should be noted as the basis for finding that this 
factor favors abandoning Glossip. 
Next, the Court must consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling 
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.224 The Eighth Amendment, like 
all of the amendments included in the Bill of Rights, is meant to protect 
citizens from overreach by the government.225 The rule of law from Glossip 
does the opposite, and the people subject to its effects cannot be said to be 
relying on it such that overturning it would lead to inequity or hardship for 
them. To the contrary, overruling Glossip would benefit people whose Eighth 
Amendment rights are currently in jeopardy because of the condition that 
Glossip placed on those rights.  
Third, the Court must ask whether related principles of law have so 
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a “remnant of 
abandoned doctrine.”226 It is doubtful that there is any conceivable way to 
construe this factor in favor of abandoning Glossip. The Court decided it a 
mere four years ago, in 2015, and it cannot be considered “a remnant of an 
abandoned doctrine.”227  
Finally, the Court must assess whether facts have so changed, or 
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification. Since Glossip, more states have begun using 
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midazolam despite the arguments for its inefficacy. While the problem is 
bigger than the use of this one drug, midazolam’s failures indicate that the 
Court got it wrong in declaring it constitutional simply because there was no 
alternative.228  
Since the Court decided Glossip, there have been numerous botched 
executions and mishaps involving midazolam,229 but even one is one too 
many when people’s well-being and constitutional rights are at stake. In 
2016, Alabama executed Ronald Smith using midazolam, and he experienced 
prolonged heaving and gasping before dying.230 The following year, 
Arkansas used midazolam to execute Kenneth Williams, and witnesses 
observed him “coughing, convulsing, lurching, and jerking.”231 These are not 
the only examples of the drug going awry, and as states began to see the 
problems with it, some began to voluntarily abandon its use.232 Midazolam 
was a newer execution drug when Glossip was decided, and there was not 
yet evidence of its failures. Now, however, there is increasing evidence of 
the pain people have suffered from midazolam, so much so that states are 
choosing to stop using it. Therefore, the facts surrounding whether the use of 
midazolam in lethal injections is constitutional have sufficiently changed, 
and they have changed in such a way that favors overruling Glossip. 
The Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, encompassing a woman’s 
right to an abortion as a part of the right to privacy.233 In deciding whether to 
overturn Roe, the Court said in Casey, “where the Court acts to resolve the 
sort of unique, intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe, its decision 
has a dimension not present in normal cases and is entitled to rare 
precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart 
its implementation.”234 While the Court was right to uphold Roe, the weight 
that the Justices placed on appearing steadfast in sticking to their opinion 
despite pressure is a dangerous premise that should not be applied in this 
context.235  
Although precedent is important and leads to consistency, the Court 
is charged with making decisions that promote justice and are consistent with 
the spirit of the Constitution. While it is arguable that an analysis of the Casey 
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factors indicate that the Court could overturn Glossip with a clear conscience, 
if the Court feels it must sustain precedent by reaffirming Glossip, it could 
follow the Casey decision in a different regard. In Casey, the Court analyzed 
the abovementioned factors and its reasons for not overturning Roe, while 
nevertheless chiseling away at it and completely revamping abortion 
regulations in the process.236 As in Casey, the Court could similarly say it is 
upholding Glossip while practically changing its core to reflect its changing 
standards. 
Roe presented the “trimester framework,” which provided that, 
during the first trimester, the states may not regulate abortions; during the 
second trimester, the government may begin to place increasing restrictions 
on abortions if they are related to maternal health; and during the third 
trimester, the government may prohibit abortions except when it affects 
mothers’ well-being because the government’s interest in potential life 
becomes compelling at the point of viability of the fetus.237 Although the 
Court claimed to be reaffirming Roe’s central holding in Casey, it rejected 
the trimester framework and held that the proper standard is that of undue 
burden.238 
In assessing whether the abortion regulations in Casey were undue, 
the Court essentially used a rational basis standard.239 This new standard 
allowed the Court to hold that requiring a 24-hour waiting period before 
allowing an abortion was not an undue burden,240 and such a regulation does 
not seem to align with Roe at all. Therefore, if the Court wants to say it is 
upholding the premise of Glossip, that lethal injection cannot be used as a 
means to unravel the death penalty, it can do that while still altering the inner 
workings and practical effects of the decision. 
While stare decisis is valued because it leads to reliability based on 
previous decisions, ultimately, the best route is for the Court to follow Justice 
Thomas’s approach and abandon precedent in this instance.241 With an issue 
as pressing as capital punishment, there are advocates with valid opinions on 
both sides. But in cases where the method of execution is not well-
established, life should be valued over death.  
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B. Proposed Approach 
The Court left some uncertainty on how to properly apply the 
requirements of Glossip.242 As subsequent cases have illustrated, there are 
many unanswered questions, including to what extent an inmate must prove 
that an alternative is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly 
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”243 Theoretically, there are two 
options before the Court: (1) uphold the two-prong test of Glossip and clarify 
the open questions about what it truly requires; or (2) overrule Glossip and 
completely rework the test. As the preceding section assessed, Glossip 
warrants being overturned.244 The Court should adopt a test that is 
unambiguous and practical, while still balancing the states’ important 
penological justifications and the interest of the inmates’ lives.  
Because of the ambiguity in what a death row inmate must prove in 
proposing an available alternative, no one can be sure what the Court was 
looking for. Surely it would not be sufficient for one to simply suggest that 
there are probably other things that might be less painful. Conversely, the 
other end of the spectrum would be a requirement that demands specifics 
from the prisoner, such as precise options including willing manufacturers 
and appropriate dosages.  What, then, should the Court look for in method of 
execution claims? 
Currently, the burden is on the inmate to show that their execution 
method poses a substantial risk of harm when compared to available 
alternatives that significantly reduce that risk of harm.245 This burden 
presents the inmate with an insuperable obstacle and should therefore be 
reassessed.246 The Court should adopt a burden-shifting framework that 
makes it at least possible that an inmate could succeed.  
To assess an Eighth Amendment challenge of a proposed method of 
execution, courts should first look to the inmate to see if he or she can prove 
the threshold inquiry of whether the proposed method presents a substantial 
risk of serious harm. To satisfy this threshold inquiry, the inmate should have 
to present non-speculative evidence, such as the known ceiling effect of 
midazolam and testimony explaining previously botched executions. To 
satisfy this standard, the inmate will have to show that the risk of harm 
exceeds the pain that may be inherent in any death.247  
If an inmate can successfully meet this threshold, the burden should 
then shift to the state to show that: (1) there are no available alternatives that 
would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain; and (2) the penological 
interests in performing the execution outweigh the risk of harm that the 
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inmate faces. If a state makes a good faith effort to secure other acceptable 
methods to no avail, it should still have to make a showing that there are 
reasons to justify putting the inmate at risk of serious harm.  
The “feasible” and “readily implemented” language from Baze and 
Glossip can still be included in the analysis, of whether there is an available 
alternative that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain, but the 
terms should be given clear definitions.248 A “feasible” method would be one 
that does not present an unreasonable burden on the state financially or 
otherwise. Furthermore, a “readily implemented” method would mean that 
the state does not have to expend unwarranted amounts of time or funds 
acquiring the materials or preparing for implementation. If an available 
method is going to be incredibly complicated and require extensive training 
and money, a state should not be required to use it. If, on the other hand, a 
state has people willing to volunteer to implement an execution by firing 
squad, that would be an example that is feasible and readily implemented.  
C. Rationale Supporting the Proposed Approach 
Adopting a threshold inquiry, after which the validity of a claim is 
triggered, is ideal because in many failed method of execution claims, 
plaintiffs’ evidence about the risk of harm was largely ignored due to their 
failure to prove an alternative.249 With the changed approach, courts will have 
to assess the weight of evidence offered to show that a method is likely to 
cause unnecessary suffering. The standard for this should be preponderance 
of the evidence, which is the standard of proof in most civil cases.250 This 
standard of proof requires that a fact be more likely than not.251 
Once this showing is met, the state would have to provide evidence 
indicating that they exerted a good-faith effort to find and implement 
reasonable and safe alternatives.252 This burden shift is necessary because it 
adds a layer of accountability on the states that would prevent them from 
adopting known controversial protocols and circumventing legal methods of 
acquisition. States would therefore be more likely to stick to appropriate 
measures for obtaining necessary execution drugs,253 which would also have 
the added benefit of pharmaceutical companies having less trouble keeping 
drugs out of executions if they desire to do so.254  
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It makes more sense and is fairer to have the state prove whether 
there is an alternative because this information is much more accessible for 
state officials than for death row inmates and their attorneys. Indeed, states 
have ensured that only state officials have this information by enacting the 
secrecy laws,255 making the burden-shifting approach even more appropriate. 
This approach also prevents states from shielding execution methods by 
neglecting to provide for any alternatives expressly by statute256 because the 
state, itself, will be considering alternative methods it can and may use. 
Finally, this burden-shifting framework is supported by public policy257 
because it encourages states to think about how they are choosing to 
implement executions by exploring all viable options and selecting those that 
are likely to meet judicial scrutiny. 
Additionally, evaluating various factors related to who should bear 
the burden of proof supports the proposed burden-shifting framework. There 
are several factors that courts consider when determining who should bear 
the burden of proof.258 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, uses 
five factors to help determine how to allocate the burden of proof.259 The 
factors are as follows: (1) “the natural tendency to place the burden on the 
party desiring change”; (2) “special policy considerations such as those 
disfavoring certain defenses”; (3) convenience; (4) fairness; and (5) “the 
judicial estimate of the probabilities.”260 At least three of the factors favor 
putting the burden on the state. 
First, plaintiffs hoping to change the current landscape of the law 
expectedly bear the burden of proof or persuasion.261 Clearly, death row 
prisoners would be the ones seeking change, so this factor favors placing the 
burden on them, which is the rationale for requiring them to at least make a 
threshold showing before the state can be troubled with proving that there are 
no feasible alternatives. 
Second, the consequences of putting the full weight on the prisoners, 
outlined in Part III, would advance the assertion that this factor supports 
shifting the burden to the state.262 If the burden remains on the prisoners, the 
result is the disfavored fact that states can implement and alter execution 
statutes so as to keep prisoners from proceeding because the prisoners’ 
proposed method is not in the statute. Because this allows states to act 
unconstitutionally by removing alternatives from the statutes, it is a less than 
ideal allocation of the burden. 
 
 255. See supra Section III.C. 
 256. See Abdur’Rahman v. Parker, 558 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tenn. 2018). 
 257. SARAT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 258. Martin J. LaLonde, Allocating the Burden of Proof to Effectuate the Preservation 
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438, 440 
(1993). 
 259. State v. McFarren, 215 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Wis. 1974).  
 260. Id. at 463–65. 
 261. Id. at 463. 
 262. Id. at 464. 
196 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:166 
Third, the convenience factor is the most important in this context. 
Courts have explained that “where the facts with regard to an issue lie 
peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving 
the issue.”263 The states are in a much better position to know what methods 
are available, if any, and what is feasible given the capacity of the staff and 
the budget, as well as the secrecy laws that put information regarding 
executions in the sole possession of state officials. Arguably, this factor alone 
is enough to shift the burden to the state. 
Fourth, the fairness factor includes proof of exceptions and proof of 
negatives.264 Proof of exceptions is inapplicable because there are no 
exceptions to the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment that anyone would need to assert. Because this proposed burden-
shifting test solicits the proof of a negative (i.e., there is no available 
alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and significantly reduces the 
risk of harm), the party that asserts that the negative is true should have the 
burden of proving it. Here, that party is the state.  
Finally, the last factor assesses the obscurity of what the parties are 
arguing and suggests that the burden should be on the party who is arguing 
the more unusual circumstance.265 Because courts very rarely determine that 
execution methods violate the Eighth Amendment, this factor would weigh 
against placing the burden on the state. Ultimately, however, there is still a 
legitimate argument that the burden shift is appropriate in this context when 
weighing all of the factors.  
If the state can meet its burden showing that there are no available 
alternatives, the structure of this proposed test would conclude by requiring 
the state to show that, if there is indeed no available alternative, the state 
should be allowed to proceed with its chosen method because it has a 
penological justification that outweighs the potential risk of harm to the 
inmate. The “penological justification” language was also used in Baze266 but 
has not been assessed because inmates have never been able to suggest an 
alternative to allow courts to reach this issue. This balancing approach would 
help courts determine when it is appropriate to uphold the method and when 
the Eighth Amendment should step in and protect an inmate from an 
unjustifiable risk of harm.  
CONCLUSION 
As Henry David Thoreau said in Civil Disobedience, “Unjust laws 
exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend 
them . . . ?”267 Glossip v. Gross is a prime example of an unjust law that 
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prejudices death row inmates: is stare decisis enough to warrant upholding 
it, or is it time to change the approach to method of execution claims? 
Considering the ever-changing landscape of the death penalty and 
the fact that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”268 it is 
time for the Supreme Court to review its previous rulings on method of 
execution claims. Since Glossip, more evidence has emerged that previously-
accepted execution methods cannot withstand appropriate constitutional 
muster, which would come to light in the face of a suitable test. Failure to 
reassess the Glossip requirements could result in more needless botched 
executions, painful deaths, and nefarious behavior by the states. 
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